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INCENTIVES FOR HIRING 
WELFARE-TO-WORK PARTICIPANTS , 
by Marv L. Heen 
Introduction 
The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002,' signed into law by 
President Bush on March 9th, extends the Work Opp01tunity Tax Credit 
(WOTC)' and the Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit (WtW)' for two more years. 
The credits provide employers with tax 
incentives to hire former long-term wel-
fare recipients and certain other eco-
nomically disadvantaged workers, a goal 
that comports with the welfare-to-work The Work Opportunity 
focus of welfare reform legislation Tax Credit and the Welfare-
adopted by Congress in 1996.' This arti-
cle describes these employer tax credits, to-Work Tax Credit provide 
explains how they have evolved from 
prior versions of similar targeted tax 
credits, and considers their operation as 
tax-delivered subsidies. 
The WOTC, enacted in 1996,' targets 
eight categories of difficult-to-place 
workers, including families eligible to 
receive welfare benefits, ex-felons, 
vocational rehabilitation referrals) food 
stamp recipients, qualified veterans, SSI 
employers with tax incentives 
to hire former long-term 
welfare recipients and certain 
other economically disadvan-
taged workers. 
recipients, and high risk or summer youths living in an empowerment zone) 
enterprise com1nunity or a renewal community.6 
The WtW tax credit, enacted in 1997,7 1nore narrowly targets workers who 
have received welfare benefits during the previous two-year period. 8 
Employers receive a tax credit for hiring former welfare recipients who have 
left welfare for work under time limits established by welfare reform legisla-
tion. 
The WOTC and the WtW tax credit, like their predecessors the Targeted 
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WIW Tax Credits:· continued.from page 1 
Jobs Tax Credit and the former credit for welfare-
related Work Incentive (WIN) Program expenses, 
have periodically expired and been extended by 
Congress, sometimes retroactively. They most 
recently expired on December 31, 2001. The exten-
sion under the legislation enacted last March is 
effective retroactively for individuals who begin 
work for employers after December 31, 2001 and 
before January 1, 2004. Legislation (H.R. 4626), 
passed by the House in May, is currently pending 
in the Senate to combine the two credits into one 
modified credit for workers from nine targeted cate-
gories (the current eight WOTC categories, slightly 
more broadly defined, plus a ninth category con-
taining a modified version of the current WtW tax 
credit). 
Some History 
Although modified somewhat from the design of 
their sharply criticized predecessors, the WOTC and 
WtW Tax Credit share essential similarities with the 
prior tax credits. They provide time-limited employ-
er wage subsidies for certain low-wage or difficult-
to-place workers.9 
As noted above, the WOTC 
replaced the Targeted Jobs 
Tax Credit, which was enact-
ed in 1978, and periodically 
lapsed and renewed until it WOTC and the 
was finally allowed to expire 
in 1994. w The Targeted Jobs WIW tax credit 
Tax Credit (TJTC) replaced the Iii Within the 
New Jobs Credit, which was 
enacted in 1977, and allowed President's (and 
to expire in 1978. u The WtW Congressional) 
Tax Credit descends from a 
former tax credit, terminated 
in the early eighties, for 
wages paid welfare recipients 
under the WIN program. 
Congress established WIN in 
1967" and modified it during 
the early seventies -to place 
certain welfare recipients in 
jobs. 13 For the ten-year period 
from 1972 through 1981, the 
political priori-
lies in "ending 
welfare" under 
the welfare leg-
islalion signed 
in 1996. 
WIN-welfare recipient tax credit allowed an 
employer a tax credit for wages paid to eligible 
employees up to specified percentages of their 
compensation during the first two years of employ-
ment." After 1981, Congress included the WIN tax 
credit in modified form as part of the 1JTC. Thus, 
in their various permutations, these kinds of 
employment tax credits have been in existence for 
thirty years. 
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The Current Credits 
The Clinton administration pushed for the WOTC and 
the WtW tax credit as a way of buttressing efforts to 
move welfare recipients into jobs. They fit within the 
President's (and Congressional) political priorities in 
"ending welfare" under the welfare legislation signed in 
1996. In justifying its proposals, the administration's 
analysis directly addressed and responded to some of 
the criticism of past programs. Two of the major criti-
cisms of the T]TC, the predecessor of WOTC, were 1) 
that the credit resulted in windfall gains for employers 
because they were subsi-
dized for doing what they 
would have done anyway 
in the absence of the pro-
gram (employ low-wage, 
low-skilled workers in 
high-turnover labor-inten-
sive businesses), 15 and 2) 
that it provided little or no 
improvement in the long-
term job prospects of the 
covered workers. 16 
Some aspects of the 
WOTC and WtW tax cred-
it were explicitly designed 
to mitigate those criti-
cisms, including the reformulation of some target 
groups, the modification of the certification process, 
the lengthening of the minimum employment periods 
for maximum credit receipt, and the increase in the 
subsidy amount to offset expected employer reluctance 
to hire long-term welfare recipients. 17 
Congressional Committee reports explained the modi-
fications adopted in WOTC, and noted the temporary 
nature of the credit as follows: 
The bill creates a new program whose design 
will focus on individuals with poor workplace 
attachments, streamline administrative burdens, 
promote longer-term employment, and thereby 
reduce costs relative to the prior-law progran1. 
The Committee intends that this short-term 
program will provide the Congress and the 
Treasury and Labor Departments an opportuni-
ty to assess full the operation and effectiveness 
of the new credit as a hiring incentive. 111 
In signing the legislation establishing WOTC, 
President Clinton emphasized that the bill responded to 
concerns about the TJTC: 
. the Act provides a significant incentive for 
employers to hire people from certain targeted 
groups most in need of jobs, such as high-risk 
youth. I am pleased to see improvements that 
address many of the concerns raised about 
implementation of the TJTC. For example, the 
3 
minimum employment period required before 
an employer becomes eligible for the credit 
will promote longer, more meaningful work 
experiences for those hired. 19 
In addition, administration officials suggested that 
combining targeted wage subsidies with a consteHation 
of other job retention services such as child care and 
transportation would improve their effectiveness.w 
There is some academic support for this view. For 
example, a study of the T]TC concluded that it may 
have "modestly improved 
the employment rates of 
economically disadvan-
taged youth," and that 
although "information/ 
stigma problems" appear 
to limit the effectiveness 
of stand-alone targeted 
wage subsidies, wage 
subsidies for less skilled 
workers such as welfare 
recipients "are likely to 
be more effective when 
utilized in conjunction 
with labor market inter-
mediaries that help pro-
vide some training, place-
ment services, and job retention assistance. "21 
Other criticistns of the TJTC were not addressed in 
the new proposals22 by virtue of their design as target-
ed or selective hiring credits rather than as general job 
credits. 2·1 These included problems of low-income 
worker displacement (r~placing ineligible workers with 
workers eligible for the credits) or discrimination 
against members of the targeted groups. 24 
The Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) 
The WOTC is intended "to provjde an important 
incentive for employers to undertake the expense of 
providing jobs and training to economically disadvan-
taged individuals, many of whom are underskilled 
and/or undereducated."25 It provides a credit of 40 per-
cent of the first $6,000 of qualified first year wages" to 
an employee who completes at least 400 hours of ser-
vice for the employer, with a lesser percentage applica-
ble for fewer hours of service. 27 The 1naximum credit 
for each targeted employee is $2,400 (40 percent of 
$6,000).'" The WOTC is structured as part of the gener-
al business credit. 29 A number of credits are combined 
into the general business credit for the purpose of 
computing how much of each credit will be allowed in 
a given year and in carryback and carryover years. 30 • 
Each individual employee must be certified by the 
"designated local agency"31 to be a member of one of 
the eligible targeted groups. The employer must 
receive the certification from the designated local 
Continued on page 4 
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:,'i,;l!gency by the time the employee begins work, or it 
:,_·:-~ID.-ust complete a "pre-screening notice" not later than 
the day the employee is offered employment. The "pre-
screening notice," Form 8850, signed by both the 
employer and the employee, must be submitted to the 
credit is intended 111 
"ease the transition 
from welfare 111 
work for the tar-
geted categories 
111 individuals bl/ 
increasing access 
111 em111011menl." 
agency within 21 days after 
the employee begins work as 
part of a written request for 
certification from the 
agency . .1 2 
Certain limitations on the 
availability of the credit 
restrict its nonbusiness use. 
The credit cannot be used for 
wages paid to an e1nployee 
who is related to or a depen-
dent of the employer or to 
an individual who is more 
than 50 percent owner of the 
business. 33 At least half of the 
employee's work must be in 
the e1nployer's trade or busi-
ness. Y4 
If the employer previously 
employed the employee at any time prior to the hiring 
date, then the employee's wage's may not be taken into 
account for purposes of con1puting the credit. 35 Other 
limitations respond to concerns about interactions with 
other federally-financed training and other subsidy pro-
grams,36 with hiring replacements during labor 
disputes,17 and with preventing circumvention by 
employers of the credit wage ceiling and other limita-
tions on the availability of the credit. 38 No credit is gen-
erally allowed to tax-exempt organizations.39 
Welfru·e-to-Work Tax Credit (WtW) 
The WtW40 tax credit is intended to "ease the transi-
tion from welfare to work for the targeted categories of 
individuals by increasing access to employ1nent. "41 It 
provides a credit amount of 35 percent of the first 
$10,000 of "qualified first-year wages" and 50 percent 
of the first $10,000 of "qualified second-year wages."" 
Employers thus may be eligible for a maximum credit 
per qualified employee of $8500 over a two-year peri-
od, beginning with the employee's first day of work." 
Wages are "qualified" if paid to employees who are 
"long-term family assistance recipients. "44 Eligible wages 
include cash wages paid to an employee plus amounts 
paid by the employer for certain health plan coverage," 
educational assistance,46 and dependent care assistance47 
for the employee. 
Each individual employee must be certified by the 
designated local agency" as coming within one of the 
three targeted categories of "long-term family assistance 
recipients," under rules similar to those that apply to 
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the WOTC." The categories generally include members 
of families 1) receiving temporary assistance to needy 
families (TANF, the successor program to AFDC) for at 
least 18 consecutive months ending on the hiring 
date; 50 2) receiving such assistance for a total of 18 
months (whether or not consecutive) beginning after 
the credit's enactment date (August 5, 1997) if they are 
hired within 2 years after the date that the 18-montb 
total is reached;" or 3) ceasing to be eligible for such 
assistance by reason of any time limits imposed by 
state or federal law, and having a hiring date not more 
than two years after the cut-off of assistance. 52 
The WtW tax credit is coordinated with the WOTC" 
anq cross references numerous definitions and other 
limitations from the WOTC.'" Each year, the employer 
n1ay choose the credit that provides the greater tax 
benefit. 55 For example, if the WOTC is selected for a 
taxable year, the WtW tax credit may be chosen by the 
employer for the following taxable year if the covered 
period from the work beginning date for first-year or 
second-year wages has not yet been completed.56 
Tax-Delivered Emplovmenl Subsidies: Advantages 
and Disadvantages 
As part of its policy deliberations, Congress should 
assess the advantages and disadvantages of using the 
tax system as a delivery 
mechanism for einployn1ent 
subsidies compared to pro-
viding them through a pro-
gram of direct grants. That 
type of assessment generally 
has not been a pa1t of 
Congressional deliberations, 
however. Under current 
political conditions, 
Congressional budget rules 
have played a large role in 
the continued use of tax 
credits as expiring provi-
sions. 
A tax-delivered benefit 
Business 
owners ma11 be more 
likel11 to 11artici11ate 
in a lax credit pro-
gram that reduces 
!heir tax 1,a11mt11 than 
in a "government 
subsidy" program 111 
does not permit the same hire certain workers. 
degree of agency discretion 
or supervision, for example, 
as a direct grant progra1n. In addition, it makes the 
inco1ne tax code more complex and difficult to 
administer. 
On the other hand, the tax system may provide some 
advantages as a delivery mechanism for an employ-
ment subsidy, particularly if a large number of the 
employers are small to 1nid-sized businesses. 57 
Businesses file income tax returns on an annual basis 
and smaller businesses generally may be more accus-
tomed with the tax system than with special employ-
ment programs offered by the Department of Labor 
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other governtnent agencies. rrhe adn1inistrative costs 
may thus be lower. In addition, business owners n1ay 
be 1nore likely to participate in a tax credit program 
that reduces their tax liability than in a "governtnent 
subsidy" program to hire certain workers. These factors 
might justify using the tax systen1 as a 1neans of deliv-
ering the subsidy to e1nployers rather than using a 
grant progra1n to provide either workers or their 
employers with wage subsidies. In addition, past prac-
tice and fan1iliarity may argue for not changing the 
delivery mechanism that has been used in the past. 58 
1~he predecessor pro-
grams of WOTC and WtW 
attributable to the WIN credit was $60 million in fiscal 
year 1981." 
Utilization of Current Credits 
Available information on the WtW tax credit and the 
WOTC suggests that utilization rates under the most 
recent version of these employment tax credits may be 
sin1ilar. In fiscal year 2001, 438,604 WOTC certifications 
were issued and 97,072 WtW certifications, for a total 
of 535,676 certifications.'" 
In fiscal year 1999, state employment security agen-
cies issued 335, 707 WOTC certifications to employers 
and 104,998 WtW certifications; corporate employers 
claimed about $138 mil-
lion in WOTC credits on 
tax credit were criticized 
as being ineffective. 
Although some of the 
same criticisn1s apply to 
the WOTC and WtW tax 
credit programs given the 
similarity in design, it is 
still early to tell whether 
these progra1ns will suffer 
fron1 the same deficien-
cies. Preli1ninary infonna-
tion gives ca use for con-
cern. Historically, e1nploy-
U1mzalion of empowerment 
z1111e em11loyme1111ax credits tends 
1997 tax returns and incli-
viduals claimed $15 mil-
lion on 1997 returns." The 
WOTC employers who 
earned most of the credits 
( 66 percent) were large 
companies with gross 
receipts of $1 billion or 
n1ore, and were engaged 
in "nonfinancial services, 
such as hotel, motel, and 
other personal services, 
111 be lliohesl among larger lmsinesses, 
suggeslin!l lhal lhe advantage of using the 
lax system 111 reach small and mid-sized 
n1ent tax credits have suf-
fered a track record of poor pa1ticipation rates. 
Experience under the nlodified credits has been sin1ilar, 
with poor utilization rates by sn1all and mid-sized 
e1nployers. 
Utillzatio11 of Former Credits 
'fhe New Jobs 'fax Credit provided subsidies for an 
estimated 1.1 million employees in 1977, and 2.15 mil-
lion in 1978." The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit covered a 
peak of 622,000 workers in 1985 (approximately 0.1 
percent of private employment) and then declined to 
364,000 in 1992, with revenue losses of about $500 mil-
lion (in 1991 dollars) in the mid-eighties, declining to 
$245 inillion in 1991.r,n Under the WIN tax credit pro-
gra1n, which had low utilization rates, "no more than 
20 percent of the WIN individuals known to have 
entered employn1ent during the year were ever claimed 
by firms as tax credits."61 According to a study done in 
the seventies, the WIN tax credit was paid on only 
88,000 workers in fiscal 1973-75 out of 515,000 WIN 
enrollees who entered the labor 1narket in that period. 
About $9 million was credited against taxes in fiscal 
1973, although part of the credit was for jobs that were 
later decertified because the employees were not 
retained for the required period of time." In 1980, WIN 
tax credits were claimed for less than 1 o percent of all 
new WIN registrants, and the annual revenue loss 
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and retail trade. "66 In an 
analysis of state agenc.y 
data from California and Texas for 1997 through 1999, 
the U.S. Genera\ Accounting Office (GAO) found that 
about 3 percent of participating employers accounted 
for about 83 percent of all hires of WOTC-certified 
employees.67 
Preliminary data from etnpowern1ent zones also 
show that utilization of empowerment zone e1nploy-
1nent tax credits tends to be highest ainong larger busi-
nesses, suggesting that the advantage of using the tax 
system to reach small and mid-sized businesses n1ay be 
overstated. A GAO survey of the utilization of employ-
ment tax credits (including the empowennent zone 
employment credit, the work opportunity credit, and 
the welfare-to-work credit) and other tax incentives in 
nine etnpowerment zones found that large businesses 
(50 or more employees) had the greatest utilization 
rates. 68 The GAO su1veyed 2400 business and received 
responses from 48 percent of the large urban business-
es, 32 percent of the small urban businesses, and 46 
percent of the rural businesses. Of those responding, 
the empowerment zone employment credit was used 
by 42 percent of large urban businesses, an estimated 6 
percent of small urban businesses, and 32 percent of 
rural businesses. Among 1ural businesses, about two-
thirds of the large businesses and about one-third of 
the small businesses reported using the credit. Large 
urban businesses and rural businesses reported claim-
Vol 6 No. 1 Spring/Summer 2002 
ing $9.1 million for tax year 1997. Most empowerment 
zone businesses did not use the WOTC or the WtW tax 
credit (tax year 1997); however, those that did tended 
to be large businesses. Specifically, 11 percent of the 
large urban businesses and 14 percent of the large rural 
businesses used the WOTC as compared with an esti-
mated 1 percent of the small urban businesses and 3 
percent of the small rural businesses. By contrast, 3 
percent of the large urban businesses, no small urban 
businesses, and 1 percent of the rural businesses used 
the WtW tax credit.69 
A study of data on the use of the federal empower· 
ment zone employment credit, based on 1996 tax 
returns, confirms those general trends. It reported a 
total of 1,254 taxpayers with such credits taken against 
regular tax liability comprised of 1,040 individuals 
(including sole proprietors, partners, S corporation 
shareholders, beneficiaries of estates and trusts, and 
cooperative patrons) and 214 taxable corporations. 70 In 
total, about $15.11 million of credits were claimed, 
about $9.59 million by individuals and $5.52 million by 
taxable corporations. On the corporate side, larger 
businesses made up a smaller percentage of businesses 
claiming the credit, but accounted for a larger propor-
tion of the credit claimed. About 72 percent of the 
credit was claimed by 
the 27 percent of taxpa11· 
ers with assets over $10 
million.11 Possible expla-
nations identified for the 
low credit usage in 
empowerment zones 
included the general 
problem with using non-
refundable tax credits to 
benefit businesses and 
individuals in economi-
cally distressed areas 
whose tax liability may 
already be small." 
Given the role of the 
employment security 
agencies in the certifica-
tion process, the admin-
istrative costs generated 
by that participation," 
and large businesses' 
greater past utilization of 
employment credits, 
these tax credit pro-
grams could be replaced by direct grant programs with· 
out loss of advantages provided by a tax-delivered pro· 
gram. However, past history with predecessor credits 
indicates that it would be unlikely for Congress to sub· 
stitute appropriations for existing WOTC or WtW tax 
credits. 
The Community Tax Law Report 
Conclusion 
The recent extension of the WOTC and WtW tax 
credit provides employers with two more years of tax 
incentives to hire certain difficult-to-place workers and 
former welfare recipients. Preliminaiy information gives 
cause for concern about the credits' low utilization 
rates and raises questions about whether the credits 
make a long·term difference in the job prospects of 
economically disadvantaged workers. Those issues will 
receive greater scrutiny as studies assess the longer-
term effects of the modified credits. 
The first wave of welfare roll reductions generally 
involved easier-to-place workers and took place during 
a period of robust employment growth, even for low. 
skilled workers. It will be even more important-and 
more difficult-in the current economic climate to pro-
vide employers with effective incentives to hire work-
ers targeted by the credits. • 
Mary L. Heen is a Professor of Law at the University of 
Richmond. Copyright (c) 2002 by Mary L. Heen. Thanks 
to Harry Carawan, a recently graduated Richmond law 
student, for his assistance this past spring in updating 
the research for this article, and to the University of 
Richmond's Hunton and Williams Summer Research 
Fund for support during its preparation. 
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Empowerment Zone Employment Credit, LR.C. § 1396, the Indian 
employment credit, LR.C. § 45A (currently scheduled to expire after 
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Practitioner's Perspective 
STRATEGIES FOR REACHING 
THE WELFARE-TO-WORK 
POPULATION 
bv Vaughn E. James 
In the book of Matthew, the Bible tells an interesting 
story of a king who hosted a marriage feast for his 
son.' The king invited several guests to the feast. Alas, 
when the great day arrived, the guests refused to come! 
One by one, they made excuses, choosing to engage in 
other activities rather than attend the reception. One 
went off to his farm, another to his place of business; 
others seized the servants whom the monarch had sent 
to escort them to the feast, treated them shamefully, 
and killed them. In the end, the king had a second 
group of servants fan out throughout the city inviting 
everyone they met to the wedding reception. By the 
Contrarvto 
reports that workfare 
is bringing tremendous 
reliel, new work ethics 
and pride to America's 
poor and underprivi· 
leged, the truth is that 
several former and 
current welfare recipi-
ents have not Ileen 
llenefiling lrom this 
llountilul harvest. 
time the feast started, the 
hall was filled with all 
sorts of people - in 
today's parlance, rich and 
poor, black and white, 
Asians and Latinos, men 
and wo1nen. 
This Biblical parable of 
the marriage feast con-
tains some interesting par-
allels to the now almost 
seven-year-old story of the 
welfare-to-work program. 
When, in 1996, Congress 
and President Clinton 
abolished welfare as it 
was and initiated the wel-
fare-to-work program,2 
they collectively acted like 
the king in the Biblical 
parable. They were pro-
viding something they 
believed to be of great 
benefit to their con-
stituents. Like the Biblical 
king, they expected their constituents to readily partake 
of this great feast. Confident that they had brought sig-
nificant, positive change to this country, both Congress 
and President Clinton lauded the virtues of the welfare-
to-workfare program.3 In fact, President Clinton himself 
loudly touted welfare reform as one of the major 
achievements of his administration. 4 
To get the program going in the right direction, the 
government united with business to form the Welfare-
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